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Law and HumanBehavior, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1989

Responses to CorporateVersus
IndividualWrongdoing*
Valerie P. Hanst and M. David Ermannt

For many years, researchersassumedthat the public was indifferentto corporatewrongdoing,but
recent surveys have discovered evidence to the contrary. Taking insights from these data a step
further,this studyemployedan experimentaldesignto examinewhetherpeople respondeddifferently
to corporateversus individualwrongdoers.We varied the identity of the central actor in a scenario
involvingharmto workers. Half the respondentswere informedthat a corporationcaused the harm;
the remainderwere told that an individualdid so. Respondentsapplieda higherstandardof responsibilityto the corporateactor. For identicalactions, the corporationwas judged as more reckless and
more morallywrong than the individual.Respondents'judgmentsof the greaterrecklessness of the
corporationled them to recommendhighercivil and criminalpenalties againstthe corporation.

Does the public advocate strong sanctions against corporatewrongdoing?Many
scholarshave lamentedthat communitysentimenttowardbusiness is so favorable
that even when a corporationdeserves punishmentthe public does not supportit
(Geis, 1973; Ross, 1907; Sutherland, 1949/1983).Other scholars have taken the
opposite point of view, assertingthat strongantibusinesssentimentleads to public
condemnationof corporatemisdeeds (Cook, 1893;Cullen, Maakestad,& Cavender, 1987;McCormick,1977).
Public opinion surveys provide supportfor both beliefs. Contemporarypolls
* Earlierversions of this paperwere presentedat the annualmeetingsof the Law and Society Association (1986),the Society for the Studyof Social Problems(1986),and the AmericanPsychological
Association (1987).Writingwas facilitatedby a NIMH Fellowshipin Psychology and Law at Stanford University to Valerie Hans. The authors wish to thank Jeffrey Davidson, Sam Gaertner,
MichaelLevi, Nancy Pennington,David Sciulli, Wes Skogan, and RobertWood for their contributions to the work. Requestsfor reprintsshouldbe sent to ValerieHans, Divisionof CriminalJustice,
Universityof Delaware,Newark, Delaware 19716.
t Division of CriminalJustice and Departmentof Psychology, Universityof Delaware.
t Departmentof Sociology, Universityof Delaware.
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indicatethat the majorityof the public holds favorableviews of business, describing the free enterprise system as "the major reason for our higher standardof
living," and agreeing that "what's good for business is good for the average
person" (Roper & Miller, 1985, pp. 12-13). Despite this overall favorability, researchin the post-Watergateera (Clinard& Yeager, 1980;Cullen, Mathers,Clark,
& Cullen, 1983;Grabosky,Braithwaite,& Wilson, 1987;Schrager& Short, 1978)
and even earlier (Gibbons, 1969; Newman, 1957; Rossi, Waite, Bose, & Berk,
1974)has shown that the public recognizes the problemof white-collarcrime and
desires punishment. Furthermore,the public believes that wrongdoing by the
powerfulis widespread(OpinionRoundup, 1986)and costly (Cullen et al., 1983).
Thus considerablesurvey evidence indicatesthat thoughAmericansstronglysupport business, they do not take corporatemisbehaviorlightly.
In assessing public reactions to corporate wrongdoing, the treatment accorded corporatemisbehavioris often comparedwith the punishmentof individual wrongdoing.Considerthe divergentresponses to the Departmentof Justice's
handling of the E. F. Hutton "check-kiting" scheme (U.S. Congress:House
1985). In that case, Hutton employees systematically and intentionally shuffled
checks amongbanks. By deceiving two or more banks into temporarilyrecording
the same funds, they created as much as $10 billion in overdrafts. After the
scheme was uncovered, the Justice Departmentimposed only civil financialpenalties.
Some commentatorsdefendedthe Justice Department'shandlingof the Hutton affair,maintainingthat the involvementof a corporationmade the case unique
and pointing out that the compensationpackage the Justice Departmentworked
out was of substantialbenefit to the financial community. In their view, justice
was done in treatingHutton differently.
However, criticismof the Hutton deal was strongand revolved aroundcomparisons of E. F. Hutton's treatmentto that of hypothetical, similarlyguilty individuals. Criticspointed out that if individualshad engaged in such massive and
premeditatedcheck-kiting,they would surely have been criminallycharged and
even subjected to jail sentences (U.S. Congress: House, 1985). As one Senator
put it, "I can name eight of my clients, when I was a lawyer, who went to jail for
check-kiting.... I'm supposedto go aroundtalkingaboutjailingpeople for drunk
driving, and you can go out and steal a million dollars and it's, hey, see you
around the club" (Welch, 1985, p. A14). In a public opinion survey conducted
shortly after the Hutton affair, a clear plurality (45%)of those who had heard
about the case declared that Hutton's punishmentwas too lenient; only 3% said
it was too stiff (Roper & Miller, 1985).
Public attitudestoward instances of corporateversus individualwrongdoing
are criticallyimportanton both theoreticaland practicalgrounds. On a theoretical
level, analysis of judgments of corporateversus individualwrongdoinghelps to
illuminatehow people consider the identity of the actor in makingattributionsof
responsibility (Shaver, 1985). Does the fact that a corporation rather than an
individualengages in a particularbehavior fundamentallytransformthe blameworthiness of the behavior, even if the action itself is identical? Social psychologists who study the perceptionof groupsmay also benefit by learningunderwhat
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circumstancesgroups such as corporationsare perceived differentlyor measured
by distinct standards.Most work on the perceptionof groups to date has focused
on intergroup relations. This work shows that after categorizing people into
groups, observers tend to assume intragroupsimilarityand to accentuate differences between groups (Deschamps, 1984;Wilder, 1986). However, judgments of
the responsibilityof individualscomparedto groups have not been investigated
systematically.
Attitudestowardcorporatewrongdoingare also importantto the operationof
the legal system. Prosecutorsconsider public attitudeswhen deciding whether to
charge someone with a crime (Jacoby, 1980;Pritchard,1986). Potential plaintiffs
may base their decision to sue on their definitionsof wrongdoing,their attitudes
toward corporations, and their perceived likelihood of success. As representatives of the public, civil and criminaljuries reflect communitysentiments in their
decisions, particularlyif the facts of the case are close (Hans & Vidmar, 1986;
Kalven & Zeisel, 1966).Finally, perceptions that corporationsare treated favorably may underminethe legal system's legitimacy, which in turncould encourage
disobedience to laws (Cullenet al., 1987;Tyler, 1987).
Sources of Differential Reactions to Individual Versus
Corporate Wrongdoing
Both the theoreticaland empiricalliteratureon corporatecrime suggest that
people may view corporatewrongdoingdistinctivelyfor a variety of reasons. The
most obvious is that individualsand corporationsfrequently engage in different
behaviors. Schragerand Short (1978) observed that the diffuse economic harm
caused by corporateentities is likely to elicit milder punitive reactions than the
focused bodily harmassociated with individualsinvolved in street crime.
Another prominentexplanationfor differentialreactions involves the typically greaterfinancialresources of the corporation,which may lead to a so-called
"deep pockets" effect. It is commonly claimed that juries award plaintiffs who
sue corporationslarger sums of money because the jurors believe that the corporations, with their "deep pockets," can afford more (cf. Chin & Peterson,
1985). Rand Corporationresearchers analyzed jury verdicts in Cook County,
Illinois, duringthe 1960s and 1970s, and discovered that claims for serious personal injuriesresultedin largerawardswhen the defendantswere corporationsor
governmentsratherthan individuals(Chin& Peterson, 1985;Hammitt,Carroll,&
Relies, 1985).
A thirdset of explanationsfor differentialtreatmentfocuses on the nonfinancial resource superiorityof organizationsover individuals.Because corporations
typically consist of a numberof individualswith specialized skills and are organized in a rationalstructure,they could be presumedto possess greaterrationality, greater foresight, and better ability to anticipate the consequences of their
endeavors than individuals. All these features, according to attributiontheory,
should enhance judgments of responsibility. Some of the research findings on
organizationalbehaviorchallengethe presumptionof greatercorporaterationality
(Ermann& Lundman,1982).Nonetheless, what mightappearas an accidentalact
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if committedby an individualmay seem purposefulwhen a groupof people engage
in the act.
Psychological research suggests several ways that judgments about groups
and individualsmight differ. Individualmembers of a group should benefit from
diffusion of responsibilitywithin the group (Darley & Latane, 1968) and should
receive fewer dispositional attributions (Wilder, 1987). Therefore, individuals
within the group should be held less culpable for wrongdoing. However, for
serious harms, the group as a whole should be attributedgreater responsibility
than a similarly situated individual. In assigning responsibility for an extreme
event, people tend to infer the existence of multiple necessary causes such as
mightbe presentin groupefforts. For example, in studies exploringthe popularity
of conspiracy theories of presidential assassinations, McCauley and Jacques
(1979) discovered that groups were seen as more effective than individuals (see
also Latane, 1981).
An additionalcontributorto distinctiveresponses, which is related to differential resources, involves assumptionsabout the impact of punishment. Considering the deterrenteffect of sanctions, the same monetary fine will have differential force depending on the financial status of the perpetrator.In retributive
terms, if corporationsare better able to foresee the consequences of their actions,
then they shouldbe punishedmore severely for their violations. This is consistent
with the link between intentionalityand sanctions that characterizes both the
criminaland the civil justice systems (Epstein, Gregory, & Kalven, 1984;Kaplan
& Weisberg, 1986;Shaver, 1985).
Some commentatorshave arguedthat, for several reasons, corporateactors
mightbe particularlysensitive to threatsof punishment.Comparedto street criminals, corporatewrongdoersmay face greater costs if their crimes are detected.
Their illegal activities may not be as deeply embeddedin their lifestyles. Hence,
corporatelawbreakersmay be more easily deterred(Cullen et al., 1987). Beliefs
about the efficacy of specific and general deterrence of corporate actors may
influence the likelihood of sanctioning.
The discussion so far suggests that if corporationsand individualscommitthe
same actions, the corporationsmight be viewed more negatively than the individuals. Yet the criminaljustice system's individualisticorientation to criminal
responsibilitymay produce more favorablereactions to corporationsunder some
circumstances. Consider the Ford Motor Company's trial on reckless homicide
charges related to a Ford Pinto gas tank explosion. After the jury acquitted the
company, commentatorsspeculated that it might have been difficult for the jury
to find criminalintent and impose criminalliability with a corporate entity when
those judgmentstraditionallyhave been associated with individuals(Cullenet al.,
1987;Swigert & Farrell, 1980-1981).
Finally, general attitudes toward business, corporations, and punishment
may lead people to treat corporate wrongdoingin particularways. Probusiness
sentimentmay lead to lenient treatment,while antibusinessattitudes may create
harshness. Experience and familiaritywith business may cut both ways, either
producingan insistence that appropriatestandardsof business conduct be maintained, or generatingsympathyfor those operatingin a business context. General
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attitudes toward punishmentmay also be implicated in responses to corporate
wrongdoing.
Comparing the Individual and the Corporation
Scholars are only beginningto isolate the varying sources of potentially distinctive reactions to corporatewrongdoingthat we have outlined above. In the
"real world," many differencesbetween individualand corporatebehavior make
it nearly impossible to equate them and to explore the issue of differentialtreatment. In the currentstudy, we overcamethis problemby constructingtwo almost
identical scenarios in which workerswere harmed.Half of the participantsread a
scenario in which "Mr. Jones" harmedthe workers, and the other half read that
the "Jones Corporation"did so. Otherwise, all aspects of the scenario, including
the behavior of the key actor and the harm to the workers, were identical. This
experimentaldesign enabled us to explore whether our subjects responded differently to corporateversus individualwrongdoing.

METHOD
Respondents
Respondentsin the experimentwere 202 studentsenrolledin an introductory
sociology course at a northeasternuniversity. Being a general education course,
it comprised students from many disciplines. Sixty-eight percent were female.
Twenty percent were majoringin business or economics, and 30.8%anticipateda
career in business. The students described themselves predominantlyas middle
class (42.3%)or upper middle class (49.0%).Approximatelyequal numbers describedthemselves as liberal(34.8%),moderate(33.3%),or conservative (31.7%).
The study was conducted during a regular class period, without prior announcement. Studentswho agreedto participatesigned a Certificateof Informed
Consent before beginning the study. All but one returnedvalid questionnaires,
resultingin 201 people in the sample.
Materials
The respondentsfirst read one of two versions of an incidentin which the key
actor hired five workers to clear a newly purchasedlot cluttered with debris. In
half the cases, "Mr. Jones" hired the workers; in the other half, the "Jones
Corporation"hired them.
After two weeks on thejob, four of the workerscomplainedto Jones that they
felt a little lightheadedand dizzy while they were clearingthe debris. Jones told
them to continueworkingbut to notify him/itif they felt worse. By the thirdweek,
three of the workersbegan to have visible tremorsand difficultybreathing.They
were subsequentlyhospitalizedfor about two weeks with severe respiratoryproblems. Follow-upphysical examinationsof all five workers revealed some perma-
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nent lung damage, rangingfrom minordamagein two workers to moderate damage in the three who were hospitalized.
City and federal inspectors analyzed the debris on the lot and discovered
significantamountsof a highlytoxic substance. Persons exposed to this substance
often experienced dizziness and respiratoryproblems similarto those of Jones's
workers. As a result of the incident, the workers decided to sue Jones in civil
court to obtain compensation.In addition, the local prosecutor decided to bring
charges of criminalnegligence againstJones.
Respondents were asked to suppose that they had been called as jurors to
decide this case in civil court. They were told that the five workershad sued Jones
for compensation for their hospital bills, their doctor bills, and their pain and
suffering.The plaintiffs'attorneysarguedthatJones shouldhave foreseen that the
lot mightcontaintoxic waste and that he/it was reckless in failing to check the lot
before hiringthe workers. Jones also should have checked out the workers' complaints before sendingthem back to work. Therefore,they arguedthat Jones was
liablefor the workers'hospitaland doctor bills totalling$80,000. Furthermore,the
lawyers arguedthat Jones should also compensate the workers for their pain and
suffering. They said that the three workers were hospitalized and who had the
most severe lung damageshould receive $100,000each, and that the two workers
who had minorlung damageshould receive $30,000each. Thus, they asked Jones
to pay $80,000in medicalexpenses and $360,000for pain and suffering,for a total
of $440,000.
The attorneyfor Jones said his client would pay the hospitalbills of the three
workers, which amountedto $40,000, but he disputed the other medical claims
and said that Jones should not be requiredto pay them. Jones also disputed that
the workers' lung damagewas entirely the result of exposure to the toxic waste,
pointing out that the three workers who had the most severe reactions were all
cigarette smokers.
We then asked respondentswhether, in their opinion, Mr. Jones/the Jones
Corporationwas liable for the claims of the workers, and if so, how many claims
they consideredjustified. We also asked respondentsto provide a dollar amount
of the awardthey would give in each category of hospital bills, doctor bills, pain
and suffering,and total award.
Following these decisions, we told respondents to imagine that they were
hearingthe criminalcase of People v. Mr. Jones/TheJones Corporationbased on
the same incident. The prosecutorarguedthat Jones acted in a reckless, irresponsible fashion in hiringthe workers to remove debris from the empty lot without
checking to make sure that the debris was not toxic. He also argued that Jones
was irresponsiblebecause Jones allowed the workers to continue clearing debris
afterthey had complainedof physical problems.The prosecutorasked the jury to
find Jones guilty of criminalnegligence. Jones, however, arguedthat he/it should
be found not guilty. Jones maintainedthat there was no reason to suspect that the
lot held toxic material,and that he/it had not behaved in a reckless fashion.
Respondents then madejudgmentsabout whether Jones was guilty of criminal negligence and indicated their recommendationsfor punishment. They also
answered 16 additionalquestions designedto tap their perceptions of the incident
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and the legal responsibilityof the actors and rankedthe key actors in terms of how
responsible each was for the incident. Finally, they provided demographicand
attitudinalinformation.

RESULTS
Financial Awards
There were strong, statistically significantdifferences in the civil judgments
between respondentsreadingthe Mr. Jones version and those readingthe Jones
Corporationversion. The Jones Corporationwas held liable for a greaternumber
of claims (Jones CorporationM = 3.96; Mr. Jones M = 3.32; F (1, 199) = 19.54,
p < .001). As shown in Table 1, workers suing the Jones Corporationwere
awardedconsistentlylargercompensationin all categoriesthanworkers suing Mr.
Jones. The most markeddifferenceoccurredwhen the respondentswere given the
greatest latitude-in the "pain and suffering" category. In this category, the
average award against the Jones Corporationwas more than twice that against
Mr. Jones.
Criminal Judgments
A similarpatternof greaterseverity towardthe corporationwas found in the
guilt judgments of criminalnegligence. Respondents made assessments on a 5point scale, where 1 correspondedto "definitelynot guilty," and 5 corresponded
to "definitely guilty" of criminalnegligence. The Jones Corporation(M = 3.51)
was much more likely to be seen as guilty of criminalnegligence than Mr. Jones
(M = 2.67; F (1, 199) = 26.80, p < .001).

The Deep Pockets Phenomenon
Table 2 (Part A) reveals that Mr. Jones and Jones Corporationrespondents
exhibitedconsiderabledivergencein theirviews of the financialdimensionsof the
incident. Not surprisingly,respondentsperceived that Mr. Jones and the Jones
Corporationwould have different financial resources and different abilities to
weather the impact of financial penalties, in that they believed that the Jones
Corporationwas more likely to be insured against the workers' claims, and that
Mr. Jones was much more likely to go bankruptas a result of the incident.
Table 1. Awardsto Workersas a Functionof Individualor CorporateWrongdoing
Categoryof award
Hospitalbills

Mr. Jones

Jones Corp.

F-value
5.78a
8.78a
21.97a
24.00a

$ 38,069

$ 40,000

Doctorbills

$ 31,337

$ 36.910

Pain and suffering
Total award

$ 82,178
$151,584

$170,700
$247,610

ap < .01.
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Table 2. Perceptions of the Incident as a Function of Individual or Corporate Wrongdoing"
Item
A. Deep Pockets
Likelihoodof insurance
Likelihoodof bankruptcy
Fair to sue
Fairnessof claims
Fairnessof offer
B. Judgmentsof Wrongdoing
Knew beforehand
Recklessness
Morallywrong
Deserves punishment
Harmto workers
Fairnessof crim. charge
C. Consequencesof Incident
Regretover incident
Effect on reputation
Individualdeterrence
Generaldeterrence
a

Mr. Jones

Jones Corp.

F-value

2.25
3.07
3.71
2.77
2.95

3.20
1.76
4.13
3.35
2.13

31.39b
93.42b
9.46b
13.37b

1.52
2.50
2.28
2.38
3.87
2.21

1.89
3.08
2.78
3.04
3.78
2.91

11.26b
15.80b
12.85b
27.61b
<1.00
16.19b

3.96
3.55
4.67
3.79

3.60
3.52
4.45
3.64

6.83b
<1.00
5.73b
1.10

32.67b

The higherthe number,the more likely, more fair, more reckless, more regretful,etc.

bp < .02.

Subjects also interpretedthe fairness of the workers' claims and the Jones
offer in line with their supposed resources. They were more likely to agree that it
was fair to sue the Jones Corporationthan it was to sue Mr. Jones. Furthermore,
they saw the workers' claims against the Jones Corporationas more reasonable
than the identicalclaims againstMr. Jones. Finally, they saw Mr. Jones's offer to
settle the claimsfor $40,000as more reasonablethanthe Jones Corporation'soffer
to settle for the same amount.All these results are consistent with a deep pockets
or cost-spreadingexplanationof differentialreaction to the corporation.
Judgments of Wrongdoing
As shown in Table 2 (PartB), the Jones Corporationwas rated as somewhat
more likely than Mr. Jones to have known beforehandthat the workers might be
harmed.Respondents saw the Jones Corporationas more reckless, more morally
wrong, and more deservingof punishmentthanMr. Jones. However, respondents
did not judge the harm done to the workers any differently. The prosecutor's
action of bringinga criminalcharge was more likely to be perceived as fair when
it was directedagainstthe Jones Corporationthan againstMr. Jones, despite legal
practice to the contrary.Respondents'rankorderingof the responsibilityof legal
actors did not differ significantlybetween the two conditions.
Consequences of the Incident
To study perceptionsof the likely deterrenteffects of the incident, we asked
several questions about the aftermath of the incident and the trials. Subjects
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estimated how much regret Jones suffered, how much the incident would affect
Jones's reputationin the community, and whether Jones's behavior and the behavior of other individuals(or corporations)would be affected by the incident.
The results are shown in Table 2 (PartC). Mr. Jones was seen as more regretful
than the Jones Corporationand he was judged as less likely to engage in similar
behavior in the future. Hence, in contrast to speculations that corporate actors
mightbe more sensitive to the impactof sanctions, our respondentsbelieved that
the incident would have greater deterrentimpact on Mr. Jones. However, the
incident was expected to affect the reputationof Mr. Jones and the Jones Corporationin the same (negative)manner.Furthermore,on our measure of general
deterrence, subjectsjudged that other individuals-or other corporations-would
be similarlyaffected by hearingabout this incident.
Predictors of Scenario Judgments
The data we have reportedso far indicate strikingdifferences in reactions to
individualand corporatewrongdoing.Regressionanalyses allowed us to examine
in more detail the relationshipsamong responses to various items and to test in a
preliminaryfashion some of the argumentsabout why judgmentsof the individual
and the corporationwere consistently different.For these analyses, we combined
responses to selected questions that representedfour conceptually distinct factors. These factors were derivedfrom researchliteraturein psychology, law, and
criminologythat indicatedtheir importanceinjudgmentsof wrongdoing.The first
variable, consisting of questions about knowing beforehandabout possible harm
and about Jones's recklessness, was labeled "Recklessness." A second variable,
"Harm," consisted of the single item about how much the workers had been
harmed.The thirdfactor, combiningthe insuranceand bankruptcyquestions, was
labeled "Finances." Finally, the fourthfactor, "Deterrence," included questions
about the actor's regret, the actor's likelihood of repeatingthe act, the likelihood
of similarothers engagingin the act, and the effect on the actor's reputation.
We then used the four factors of Recklessness, Harm, Finances, and Deterrence as predictor variables in stepwise regression equations for respondents'
judgments of civil liability, total award, and criminalnegligence. Results of the
regression analyses are presented in Table 3. The most strikingconsistency was
the strong relationshipbetween the Recklessness factor and judgments of civil
liability, total award, and criminalnegligencein both the Mr. Jones and the Jones
Corporationconditions. Regressioncoefficients rangedfrom .43 to .59, indicating
the robust and steady impact of Recklessness judgments across the different
conditions and types of decisions.
Forjudgmentsof civil liabilityand total award,when all data were considered
together (Table 3, Column 1), Recklessness was the only significant predictor,
accounting for 27% of the variance in civil liabilityjudgments and 24% of the
variation in total award. For judgments of criminal negligence, Recklessness
continued to be the most importantpredictor, with 31% of the variance, but
Deterrencealso proved to be a significantpredictor,accountingfor an additional
2% of the variationin estimates of criminalnegligence.
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Table 3. Predictors of Scenario Judgmentsa
Factor

All data

Mr. Jones

Jones Corp.

A. CivilLiability
Recklessness

.48b

.52b

.45b

Harm
.19c

Finances

-.22b

Deterrence
B. TotalAward
Recklessness

.49b

.43b

.45b

Harm
Finances
Deterrence
C. CriminalNegligence
Recklessness

.57b

Harm
Finances
Deterrence

.59b

.45b

- .27b
.15S

a Entriesare standardized

regressioncoefficients(beta weights)of variablesin the final equationsin
stepwise regressionanalyses. All items were coded for the analyses so that highernumbersindicate
greatercivil and criminalliability, higherawards, more financialresources, more deterrence,etc.

p < .01.
Cp < .05.

Separate stepwise regression analyses for respondents in the Mr. Jones and
the Jones Corporation conditions produced similar overall patterns, but a few
differences should be noted. In the Mr. Jones condition (Table 3, Column 2),
Recklessness was a significant predictor, accounting for 27% of the variance in
Civil Liability responses, but Finances also emerged as a significant factor, explaining an additional 4% of the variation. The greater the perceived financial
resources of Mr. Jones, the greater the judgments of his civil liability, consistent
with a deep pockets explanation. For the Mr. Jones respondents, Recklessness
was the only significant predictor of total award and criminal negligence, accounting for 19% and 34% of the variance respectively.
Recklessness continued to be an important predictor for the Jones Corporation respondents (Table 3, Column 3), accounting for 20% of the variation in all
three judgments of civil liability, total award, and criminal negligence. For the
Jones Corporation respondents, Finances was a secondary significant predictor of
judgments of civil liability and criminal negligence, accounting for an additional
5% and 7% of the variance, respectively.
However, the impact of Finances was opposite to that which would be expected from a deep pockets analysis. If financial resources was an important and
independent consideration that pushed awards upward, we should have observed
strong positive relationships between respondents' estimates of Finances and
their civil judgments, particularly total award. However, the relationships be-
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tween presumedfinancialresources andjudgmentsof wrongdoingwere negative:
The less the perceived resources of the Jones Corporation,the greater the judgments of civil liabilityand criminalnegligence. Also of note was the fact that total
award and Finances were not significantlyrelated in the Jones Corporationcondition (r = -.05, n.s.). This patternof responses suggests that in their Finances
ratings, the Jones Corporationrespondentswere reflecting an evaluative assessment (e.g., a terriblefly-by-nightcorporationlike Jones that would harmworkers
would not bother to be insured).
The combined results of the regression analyses indicate that the most importantfactor underlyingall decisions was the respondent'sjudgmentof recklessness. What does this suggest about the consistent differences between the Mr.
Jones and the Jones Corporationconditions?Our conjecture is that respondents
made assessments of recklessness within the specific context of individual or
corporate misbehavior, apparentlyapplying a different standard of care to the
two types of actors. Those recklessness judgments then determined their decisions about criminaland civil culpability and the total award. Other considerations such as financialresources and deterrenceappearedto play only a modest
independentrole.
The Influence of Individual Differences
To assess the effects of attitudinaland demographicvariables, we examined
the relationshipsbetween these variableswithin the Mr. Jones and Jones Corporation conditions for respondents' assessments of civil liability, total award, and
criminal negligence. Respondents' ratings of the ethical and moral practices of
corporateexecutives and of small business proprietorswere generally unrelated
to their scenariojudgments. Respondents'gender and social class were also unrelated.
Politicalliberalism-conservatismwas significantlyassociated withjudgments
of civil liability and total award, but only in the Jones Corporationcondition. In
that condition,the more conservativethe respondent,the lower the assessment of
civil liability and the lower the total award (r = - .28 and - .33 respectively, both

p's < .01). In the Mr. Jones condition, both correlationswere nonsignificant(r =
-.06 and -.03, n.s.). Correlationsbetween political orientation and criminal
negligencejudgments, however, were not statistically significantin either of the
two conditions (r = -.10 and -.16, n.s., for Mr. Jones and Jones Corporation

conditions). This configurationof results indicates an association between political liberalism-conservatismand judgments of corporatebut not individualcivil
wrongs.
Another interesting pattern of results emerged when we compared those
respondentswho were majoringin business and were planninga business career
(N = 31) with the remainderof the sample. Althoughtheirjudgmentsof criminal
and civil culpabilitywere no different, the total awards of the business-oriented
respondents were significantly higher (M = $242,580) than the awards of the
others (M = $192,581; F (1, 197) = 5.54, p = .02). If we assume that the business-
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oriented respondents had a more accurate assessment of the values of the claims,
then the respondents who were more naive about business were apparently undervaluing the workers' claims. To further explore the impact of business knowledge and experience on judgments of corporate wrongdoing, it will be necessary
to examine the reactions of other populations that have more familiarity with
business.

DISCUSSION
Even though our research provides an interesting new approach to studying
attitudes toward corporate wrongdoing and its results converge with studies employing different methodologies, we want to note some limitations of the study
before we discuss its broader implications. Although our study employed juror
simulation methodology, we did not intend the study to be a highly realistic
simulation of actual jury decision making. We used a student sample. In addition,
although our respondents received much richer descriptions than participants in
other crime-seriousness studies, the scenario presented less information than in a
real trial court. Jurors would never serve in both civil and criminal proceedings,
as our respondents did in the present experiment. And given current legal practices, the particular case we employed might not find its way to court.
Bray and Kerr (1982) and Lind and Tyler (1988) have argued convincingly
that experiments need not exactly duplicate the real world to be valid. Furthermore, we doubt that the nature of the sample was responsible for the overall
pattern of results. Studies comparing student ratings of crime seriousness to those
of other subpopulations (Rossi et al., 1974; Sellin & Wolfgang, 1964) show similar
response patterns, suggesting the appropriateness of student samples for experimental work. Although in future studies we hope to replicate the research with
other populations and scenarios, we would maintain that the experimental method
as we have employed it here is uniquely valuable in providing an analytical instrument to unpack the public's complex response to corporate wrongdoing.
The results of our experiment suggest that people have a strong, distinctive
reaction to corporate wrongdoing. Even when their actions are identical, corporations and individuals are judged in divergent ways. Our respondents held the
corporation to a higher standard, judged it to be more reckless and more morally
wrong in its behaviors, and punished it more severely. Respondents defined recklessness differently for individuals and corporations, and these judgments of recklessness played a pivotal role in driving respondents' decisions about liability and
negligence in the scenario case. The importance of recklessness in the present
study converges with attribution research showing that intentionality is a key
factor in the assignment of blame.
The discovery that our respondents reacted very negatively to corporate
wrongdoing is consistent both with recent public opinion survey findings of hostility to corporate misbehavior and with research on people's attitudes toward
white-collar and business crime. General favorability toward business evident
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from survey studies does not appearto produce leniency towardbusiness wrongdoing in individualcases. Interpretedbroadly,the results of this study lend weight
to the voices of many current scholars who argue that public unwillingness to
sanction corporatemisbehavioris a myth.
In the introductionwe outlined a number of reasons why the corporate or
individualidentity of the wrongdoermight alter perceptions of wrongdoing, includingfinancialand nonfinancialresource advantages,attributionalphenomena,
negative stereotypes of corporations, assumptions about the impact of punishment, and the individualisticorientationof the criminaljustice system. It is useful
to assess the extent to which our findings are consistent with these various
sources of distinctive treatment.
The resource advantagesof the corporationcould explain why respondents
defined recklessness differentlyfor the corporationand the individual.If respondents presumed that the corporationpossessed greater rationality and superior
ability to foresee the consequences of its actions, they may have felt justified in
insisting on a higher standard.Consistent with this possibility, our respondents
indicatedthat the corporationwas more likely to have known beforehandthat the
workers might be harmed.
However, an alternativeexplanation is also possible: that negative stereotypes of the corporationpredisposedsome of our respondentsto perceive ambiguous corporatebehaviorskeptically.Certainlythe apparentcynicism toward corporationsrevealed by our respondentsfits with this alternativeanalysis. Respondents believed that the Jones Corporationwas less regretfuland more likely to
engage in similarbehaviorin the futurethan Mr. Jones. In this light, the respondents'judgmentsthat the corporationwas more likely to have known beforehand
may have reflected not so much their views of the superior abilities of the corporationbut their beliefs about its greaterpropensityfor maltreatment.
If negative stereotypes of corporationswere responsiblefor the respondents'
advocacy of harsher treatmentof the Jones Corporation,we should have seen
significantrelationshipsbetween our respondents' attitudes toward the corporation and their scenariojudgments.However, theirratingsof the ethical and moral
practices of corporate executives and of small business proprietors were not
associated with their evaluationsof the Jones Corporation.Interestinglyenough,
the respondents' political conservatism was significantly related to their judgments of corporate(but not individual)wrongdoing.The more liberalthe respondents, the more they believed that the corporationwas civilly liable and the more
money they awardedto the plaintiffs.Politicalliberalismmay predispose respondents to adopt an expansive view of corporateresponsibility.
On the basis of our data, we cannot designate either perceptions of resource
superiority or negative stereotypes as the motivating force behind differential
treatmentof the corporation.However, it is interestingto note that both of these
factors are likely to producegreaterdemandson the corporationfor compensation
for wrongdoing.
As for the deep pockets effect, our respondents clearly differentiatedthe
availablefinancialresources of Mr. Jones and the Jones Corporationand awarded
plaintiffssuing the corporationmore compensation.Nevertheless, the regression
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analyses indicatedno consistent effect of presumedresources on awards. Instead,
higher awards in the Jones Corporationcondition were linked more strongly to
recklessness judgments, suggestingthat they functioned more to punish reckless
behavior than to pick a deep pocket. Future research varying financial and nonfinancialresources of individualsand corporationscould address the importance
of each type of resource to judgments of wrongdoing. But our study hints that
those who claim deep pockets influencejury awards may be neglecting to take
into account a coexisting and more critical determinant:higher expectations of
corporatebehavior.
The finding that a group such as a corporationis attributedmore responsibility than an individualfor the same action has some suggestive implicationsfor
psychologicaltheory. Althoughthese effects could be due to the subjects' knowledge of resources or stereotypes of individualsand corporations,another possibility to be explored in futureresearchis that the process of social categorization
leads to inferences that groups and group actions have greater impact (Latane,
1981;Wilder, 1986).
There were some clues in the data that people may have distinctive preferences for punishingthe corporation.The corporationwas perceived to be less
regretfuland more likely to engage in similarharmfulactions in the future, indicating the need for strongersanctions to deter behavior. There was no evidence
that the corporationbenefited from the criminaljustice system's individualistic
orientation:Respondentswere more likely to supportcriminalcharges againstthe
Jones Corporationthan against Mr. Jones.
Ourstudy bolsters argumentsadvancedin a recent theoreticalpaperby Donald Black (1987). Relying on historicaland cross-culturaldata, the authorpoints
out that although once families and clans provided some relief for individual
misfortune, there was a historical shift toward individualresponsibility, which
reachedits zenith in the nineteenthcentury. Since that time, there has been steady
movement toward a different source of collective responsibility-the organization. Black perceives the contemporaryexpansion of theories of liability for organizations and the greater willingness of citizens to seek compensation from
organizationsfor harmas part of a full circle, from one kind of collective responsibility (the familyor kinshipgroups)to another(organizations).He proposes that
as a consequence of these historicalchanges, we should now perceive the liability
of groupsto be greaterthanthe liabilityof individuals.Ourstudy provides striking
support for Black's assertion by demonstratingthat even under conditions of
identicalaction and harm,the corporationis held more culpablethan the individual.
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